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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN BOWMAN, H E N R Y J.
BOWMAN, SARA J U N E P E T T E R SON, and M I C H A E L B O W M A N ,
a minor, by June Bowman, his Guardian,
Plaintiff s/R espondents,
-vs-

Case No.
13657

JOHN DUSSAULT, DOROTHY
D U S S A U L T and D O N A L D
BOWMAN,
Defendants/Appellants.

APPELLANTS JOHN AND DOROTHY
D U S S A U L T ' S B R I E F ON A P P E A L

STATEMENT OF
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The Appellants, John Dussault and Dorothy
Dussault appeal from a Judgment of the District Court
of the Second Judicial District, the Honorable John F .
Wahlquist, Judge, imposing liability against them in
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the sum of $143,526.03 based upon a claim of respondents that the appellants were liable for mismanagement of a trust of which plaintiffs were beneficiaries.
DISPOSITION I N T H E COURT B E L O W
Respondents, contingent beneficiaries of a trust
which the appellants, John and Dorothy Dussault and
Donald Bowman were trustees, filed suit in the District
Court of the Second Judicial District, Weber County,
alleging liability against the appellants due to the alleged
neglect and failure of appellants to properly discharge
duties as trustees (R. 16-17). Trial was held beginning
the 10th day of December, 1973, in the District Court
of Weber County, sitting without a jury. Judgment
was entered on the 5th day of March, 1974, in favor of
the plaintiffs as heretofore mentioned.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment of
the District Court with instructions to enter a judgment
of no cause of action or in the alternative for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Relationship of the Parties. Marie Dorothy
Wattis, a lady of substantial wealth executed a trust
instrument in February, 1938, in which she disposed of
her property by establishing two separate trusts, one
for her daughter, Estella Wattis Bowman, and another
trust for her daughter, Mary Brown. (R. 3-9; 59-71).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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According to the trust instrument, Estella Wattis
Bowman, and Mary Brown were life beneficiaries of
their respective trusts and entitled to all of the income
during their lifetimes. Their mother also appointed
them Trustees of each of the trusts.
Upon the death of Marie Dorothy Wattis, the
Wattis' estate was divided in equal parts and this litigation is involved only with the half of the Wattis estate
that passed to Estella Wattis Bowman, referred to
herein as Mrs. Bowman.
Mrs. Bowman had three (3) children, William A.
Bowman, the father of the plaintiffs in this action,
Donald Bowman and Dorothy Bowman Dussault. John
Dussault, one of the defendants, is the husband of
Dorothy Dussault. (R. 236-240).
In addition to Estella Wattis Bowman acting as
Trustee, in her own trust, Mary Brown, her sister, and
also her husband were Trustees.
In 1948, Mrs. Bowman's husband died and Dorothy
Dussault was made Trustee (R. 237). In 1960, Mrs.
Bowman's sister, Mary Brown, died and, at that time,
Mrs. Bowman and Dorothy Dussault appointed John
Dussault Trustee (R. 239).
B. Background on John Dussault. By way of
formal education, John Dussault had only two weeks
in the sixth grade (R. 288). After, he worked as dishwasher in a restaurant, a short-order cook, shipping
clerk, etc., until 1930, when he saved up enough money
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and bought a truck and went into the trucking business
(R. 288). Thereafter, he schooled himself by reading
manuals and books relating to insurance, real estate,
etc. (R. 287). Until he was made Trustee in the estate
of his mother-in-law, he had no stock investments experience whatever (R. 290).
At the time he was requested by his mother-in-law
to act as Trustee he was reluctant to do so, particularly
in view of a lawsuit or threatened lawsuit by some of
the family in relationship to the Mary Brown half of
the trust (R. 293).
Mrs. Bowman took out the trust instrument, read
it to John and explained how the trust had been deliberately set up so that the trustees could handle the
property as though it were their own property, the
trust had exculpatory provisions deliberately written
in to protect the trustees, and that they would not be
vulnerable or susceptible to being sued as long as they
were doing the best they could with the trust. At that
time, she suggested to John that he call attorney Bridges,
who prepared the trust instrument and verify her assurances. Attorney Bridges was a member of the firm
Allen, Warren and Bridges in San Francisco. John
took her advice, called Mr. Bridges to determine the
extent of his liability in the event he was to act as trustee
(R. 252-4).
Attorney Bridges went into considerable detail with
John during their telephone conversation when Dussault
was advised by Bridges that he would not assume perDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
sonal liability because of exculpatory provisions in the
trust. Thereafter, John accepted the appointment and
agreed to act as Trustee (R. 295). This was in 1961
(R. 290).
Mrs. Bowman expressed her desires to revise the
portfolio of the trust, disposing of the bonds, etc., indicating that she wanted growth for income, that she was
strapped for income as a result of the support she had
to give the William H . Bowman family and further the
expenses she incurred trying to get him out of trouble
(R. 256-257). Mrs. Bowman was a very strong woman
and had great influence on the management of the trust,
particularly in view of the fact that she was the life
beneficiary and Trustee (R.307) (Findings of Fact
and R. 192).
C. Trustee Conduct. When John Dussault agreed
to act as Trustee, the value of the trust was approximately $188,000.00. (R. 297-298). Sometime in or
around 1965, the Trustees began purchasing stocks on
margin (R. 300). The margin purchases were discussed
in advance with Mrs. Bowman, Dorothy Dussault and
Bill Bowman (R. 301). At that time, it was logically
assumed by everyone that Bill, Dorothy, and Don would
inherit the trust property because their mother was elderly and they were all in reasonably good health. It is
reasonable to assume she must have anticipated her
death within a reasonably short period of time, since
she distributed $180,000.00 to each of her children in
April of 1965 (R. 424), and the court found that she
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was suffering from a circulatory disease in the form of
hardening of the arteries and by 1964 she and others
began to anticipate her death. A s a result of purchasing
on margin the value of the estate was increased in 1967
to $442,000.00 (R. 302). D u r i n g the next several years,
however, as investments were made on margin, the trust
diminished (R. 303).
D u r i n g that period of time, the stock market was
failing every day a little bit at a time and the analysts
were saying that the market was going to t u r n around
and things were going to get better and the Trustees
hoped that this would be true (R. 306). D u r i n g that
period of time, Mrs. Bowman made it clear to J o h n
Dussault, Dorothy and Bill and others that she had a
right to govern that trust and that she even had a right
to take the entire corpus of the trust if she wanted (R.
307).
W h e n J o h n Dussault became Trustee, Mrs. Bowman advised him that from the years 1958 to 1959, the
estate had decreased in value from $204,000.00 down to
$188,000.00, because they were conservative, because
they had invested in conservative type bonds, etc. (R.
237). Mrs. Bowman felt that since she had made substantial cash contributions to her children that it was
now important to make the trust grow (R. 250, 256).
A s Dorothy Dussault testified, Mrs. Bowman wanted
growth both to increase the corpus and for income (R.
256).
Notwithstanding what could logically be anticipated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the family, William Bowman was killed in an automobile accident in May 1970 (R. 423). Mrs. Bowman
survived until October 31,1970 (R. 447). The plaintiffs
in this action are the children of William Bowman who
have now filed action against their Aunt Dorothy Dussault, their Uncle Donald Bowman, and their Uncle
John Dussault, for having dissipated the estate through
their investment practices.
D. Investment Practices. When John Dussault
became a successor Trustee, the trust was administered
by the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco (R.
239-240). Advice on trust investments was obtained
from Crocker National, Glore, Foregon & Stats and
Dean Witter and Company (R. 241-242). Mrs. Bowman also made several suggestions on investment policy
(R. 242). Eventually, the administration of the trust
was moved to Commercial Security Bank in Ogden,
Utah. Mrs. Bowman played an active role in the trust
and was consulted in virtually every stock transaction
(R. 291). Mr. Dussault testified that he conducted the
investment of the trust the best he knew how and with
the same diligence as he would his own account (R.
295). H e contacted brokers and read everything he
could on investments. I n addition to the before-mentioned companies from which he sought advice, he also
sought advice from William R. Scott Company (R.
299), and relied heavily upon Mr. Bob Erickson of Dean
Witter and Company. No broker warned the Dussaults
of any risk associated with investing on the margin (R.
300). The purchase of conglomerates was favored in
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the market and Mr. Dussault felt diversification was a
safety in their purchase (R. 313). H e was not full time
in the administration of the family trust but had to
operate his own business (R. 314). Mr. Dussault's own
investments, aside from the trust, paralleled those in
the portfolio of the trust (R. 427). During the investment period when Mr. Dussault was Trustee, he consulted with numerous persons concerning appropriate
investments (R. 441). H e was never dissuaded from
purchasing on the margin (R. 442). H e submitted the
trust instrument to Dean Witter and Company and they
submitted the document to their legal department and
advised that investing on the margin would be acceptable
(R. 442, 451). The attorney who drafted the instrument apparently confirmed that the Trustees had such
power (R. 442). A letter dated November 17, 1961
(Plaintiff's Exhibit H ) from Robert L. Bridges, Attorney at Law in San Francisco, who prepared the instrument, advised the Dussaults of their very broad
authority to invest under the trust. Article 8 of the trust
instrument quoted in the Exhibit gave the trustees authority to hold property of the trust estate in any
property "whether or not any property at any time so
held or any investments so made shall be of the character
permitted by law for investment of trust funds" and
also provided "the trustees, however, to assume or be
under no personal liability in respect to any securities
at any time held hereunder" and "in the execution of
this trust they shall have the same and all powers and
discretion that an absolute owner of property has or may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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have . . . " Mr. Dussault testified that he acted for the
trust and followed the advice received. H e acted for the
trust. H e was aware that if the trust lost money, his
wife, a beneficiary, would also lose (R. 444). The trustees received no compensation for their services.
Respondents called an expert with reference to the
investments (T. 342). When asked about Gulf and
Western stock that had been purchased by appellants
for the trust, he indicated that it was not a stock he followed carefully but knew it to be a conglomerate stock.
The trial court interjected that he had held Gulf and
Western and sold it. (R. 354) Subsequently, the court
took judicial notice of the whole conglomerate industry
and in his findings concluded that such investments were
highly speculative and that this included the stock of
Gulf and Western (R. 194). Appellants' expert testified as to the necessity to minimize risks and felt that
margin buying was not accepted practice (R. 354). H e
felt that the type of investments made during 1968 and
1969 during the time the losses were suffered would be
proper only if following a very aggressive approach
(R. 355). An examination of his testimony shows that
most of the stocks in which the trust invested during
the period 1968 and 1969 were high yield stocks (R.
305) with ratings of B or B + on the Standard and Poor
scale. H e indicated that the loss of money was no indication of bad faith (R. 376) and that the investing on
the margin simply went beyond the period of profitability (R. 375-376).
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E . Reno Ranch. Respondents claim additional
damages against appellants resulting from a real estate
transaction between John Dussault and respondents'
grandmother, Mrs. Bowman. This action was not specifically plead in the complaint (R. 1) or the amended
complaint (R. 6) but was stated as a contention in the
pre-trial order (R. 119).
Mrs. Bowman was the sole owner of a piece of real
property located by the Truckee River, outside the City
of Reno, Nevada. The property was not in the trust.
I t was known by the family as the Reno Ranch. The
ranch was unproductive and deteriorating (R. 325, 335).
Mrs. Bowman had asked John Dussault what he thought
she ought to do with the ranch (R. 335). Dussault went
to Reno and had the ranch appraised at somewhere between $90,000.00 and $110,000.00 (R. 335). The
Truckee River would overflow from time to time and
do substantial damage to that property (R. 335).
Because of the problems related to the ranch, the
flooding from time to time, the great distance that the
Bowmans live from the ranch, the deteriorated condition
of the buildings, etc., Mrs. Bowman approached John
and asked him if he would trade it to her for another
piece of property that he owned in his own name in
Reno, Nevada, known to the family as the "Airport
Road Property." (R. 33(5) That property was a corner
lot in downtown Reno, leased out for $1,000.00 per
month (R. 340). As a result of her offer, John and
Dorothy invited Donald, Bill and Mrs. Bowman to go
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to Reno for purposes of determining whether the trade
of the ranch for the airport property was a fair and
equitable trade. They went to Reno, saw the property
and agreed that it was a fair trade (R. 336). At that
time, the ranch was appraised by a local appraiser at
the sum of $88,000.00 (R. 338). The airport road property, which was solely owned by John Dussault, was
appraised at that time at $95,000.00 (R. 338). A direct
trade was made at that time between John Dussault
and Mrs. Bowman. That transaction was evidenced by
a deed in June, 1961. More than two years later, Mrs.
Bowman transferred the airport road property into her
trust by deed dated January 28, 1964. The purpose of
the transaction, trading the Reno ranch for the airport
road property was to provide income to Mrs. Bowman
(R. 501). At the time of the transaction, all of the family members were in Reno (R. 504). Subsequently, John
Dussault sold the Reno ranch and realized $92,735.00
(R. 506). The court found that the Reno ranch was
sold by John Dussault for $120,000.00. The plaintiffs
claim one-third of the difference between the value of
the airport road property in the sum of $95,000.00 and
the sale price of the Reno ranch in the sum of $120,000.00, or $8,333.33. The Reno Ranch property at the
time of the transaction was not a part of the trust but
was Mrs. Bowman's own property and John and
Dorothy Dussault were not acting as Trustees.
F . Trial Court's Findings and Judgment. The
trial court's Findings of Fact do not give adequate attention to the trust instrument and no reference in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Conclusions of Law is made to the applicable standard
the trial court used in determining liability. With reference to the stocks, the court found some of the investments too speculative (R. 195). The court found that
because of lack of diversification and use of margins
invested during 1968, 1969 and 1970, the trust was improperly managed resulting in losses of $296,577.00
(R. 195-196). The court found that from 1966, the
trust was managed primarily for the interest of the
ultimate beneficiaries and not the life beneficiary and
the margin investment constituted gross inattentiveness
(R. 194). The court found no lack of good faith up to
1966 (R. 192). The court found that the breach of duty
by John and Dorothy Dussault was gross inattentiveness equivalent to bad faith and awarded $100.00 punitive damages (R. 197). Based on the Findings, the
court entered judgment against the appellants in the
amount of $143,526.03. Included in this judgment was
an award to the appellants for $9,638.00 because of a
transaction involving the Reno ranch property heretofore mentioned which did not involve the trust but
which the trial court, through some inexplicable reason,
found the trust to be entitled to the recovery (R. 198).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN
FINDING
LIABILITY
AGAINST
T H E A P P E L L A N T S FOR TRUST
MISMANAGEMENT
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The trial court determined that the appellants were
liable to respondents for breach of their obligation as
trustees. I t is submitted that this determination is erroneous as a matter of law and that this court should reserve and direct an entry of j u d g m e n t in favor of the
appellants. T h e basic question presented by this point
on appeal is whether the appellants, J o h n and Dorothy
Dussault, violated their trust obligations in the administration of the Marie Dorothy W a t t i s trust. § 33-2-1,
U t a h Code Annotated, 1953, is a statutory expression
of the so-called "prudent man" rule first adopted in
this country in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass.
(9 Pick.) 446 (1830). However, this court has recognized that the before-referenced statutory provision is
subject to the provisions of § 33-2-2, U t a h Code Annotated, 1953, and does not govern where a trust instrument provides a contrary standard. I n Dipo v. Dipo,
526 P.2d 923, (Utah 1974), this court was confronted
with the question as to whether the provisions of § 332-1, U t a h Code Annotated, 1953, heretofore referenced
controlled or whether a trust instrument could provide
for a different standard of trustee conduct. This court
observed:
The trial court dismissed the complaint
finding, among other facts, that the proposed
purchase of assets from the estate was authorized by paragraph 10 of the trust agreement.
W i t h this finding we agree. The terms of said
paragraph are clear, unambiguous and confer
upon the trustees considerable discretion. The
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powers so conferred are much broader than
Section 33-2-1, U.C.A. 1953, might confer,
but would appear to be statutorily authorized
by Section 33-2-2, U.C.A. 1953.
Furthermore, it is a generally accepted
principle of law that the terms of the trust,
unless illegal or agaimt public policy, govern
over such statutes as the 'prudent man' statute
of this State with regard to the investment of
trust funds. (Emphasis added).
This is in accord with the general rule that a trust instrument may control trust investments or authorize
standards other than those set out in statutes unless
there is the clear intention of the legislature to the contrary. Bogart, Trusts and Trustees, 2d ed. § 543, 681.
Further, it is well established that in interpreting a
trust agreement, the court should make an effort to effectuate the purposes and intent of the settlor. Arizona
v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259 (Ariz. 1966) :
A general principle of law applied to either
a private or charitable trust is, that when a
Trust is created by a written instrument, the
intention of the Settlor is ascertained from
the express language of the instrument, and
the Court will not go outside the instrument
in an attempt to give effect to what it conceives
to have been the actual intent or motive of
the Settlor. If, however, the intention is not
plainly expressed, or if the language used is
ambiguous, there are well established rules
which Courts will envoke to aid them in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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construction of the instrument.
added)

(Emphasis

See also, Edwards v. Edwards, 459 P.2d 422 (Wash.
App. 1969). I t is therefore necessary to look at the
trust instrument in the instant case to ascertain the intention of the settlor as to the standards of conduct to
which the appellants were to be held and the ultimate
liability for their conduct. Article V I I I of the trust instrument provides:
To carry out the express purpose of this
trust, and in aid of its proper execution and
the administration, management, and disposition of the trust estate, the T R U S T E E S are
vested with the following powers and discretions :
At their option and as long as they may
deem advisable, within the term of this trust,
to retain and hold any property of the trust
estate, and to invest and reinvest the principal
(and income if accumulated) in any property,
whether or not any property at any time so
held or any investments so made shall be of
the character permitted by law for investment
of trust funds. To manage, control, sell, convey, partition, divide, subdivide, exchange, improve, repair, and to encumber by mortgage,
trust deed, or otherwise and in accordance with
such proceedings as they may deem advisable,
the trust estate or any part thereof. To lease
the trust estate or any part thereof for terms
within or extending beyond the term of this
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trust and to grant, for like terms, the right
to mine or drill for and remove therefrom gas,
oil, or other minerals. To allot and distribute
the trust estate at such valuations as the
T R U S T E E S may determine upon whenever
such act shall be required, and to do do in
kind or partly in kind and partly in money,
according to their valuation thereof. To determine, in their discretion, what is principal of
the trust estate, gross income, or net distributable income therefrom. To effect insurance
of such forms and of such amounts as necessarily shall be required for the proper protection of the trust estate. To determine the identity of persons entitled to take hereunder and
the proportions in which they shall take. To
have respecting bonds, shares of stock, and
other securities, all the rights, powers, and
privileges of an owner including, though without limiting the foregoing, holding securities
in the name of the T R U S T E E S or otherwise;
voting, giving proxies, payment of calls, assessments and other sums deemed by the
T R U S T E E S expedient for the protection of
the interests of the trust estate, exchanging
securities, selling or exercising stock subscriptions and conversion rights, participating in
foreclosures, reorganizations, consolidations,
mergers, liquidations, pooling agreements,
voting trusts, assenting to or opposing corporate sales, leases, and encumbrances; the
T R U S T E E S , however to assume or be under
no personal liability in respect of any securities
at any time held hereunder. To reimburse
themselves out of the income and/or principal
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of the trust estate for any loss, liability, or
expense personally sustained or incurred by
reason of their ownership or holding of any
property received or held in trust. In the execution of this trust, they shall have the same
and all powers and discretions that an absolute
owner of property has or may have; and all
discretions in this instrument conferred upon
the T R U S T E E S , unless specifically limited,
shall be absolute and uncontrolled. The
T R U S T E E S shall have the continuing uncontrollable discretionary powers herein given,
with regard to both real and personal property,
as well as and in addition to the powers and
authority conferred by statute or otherwise
lawfully existing, all to be exercised by them
without application to or the prior consent or
subsequent approval of any court or judicial
authority; and all their acts in good faith
hereunder shall be conclusive on all parties in
interest, and no person dealing with them shall
be under any duty to inquire into the necessity
or propriety of their acts or to see to the application of any money or other property delivered
to them.
As can be seen, the provisions of the trust instrument
grant to the trustees broad power in managing the corpus of the trust and appear to manifest an intention
on the part of the settlor that the liability of the trustees
was to be very limited. In fact, the language of the
trust instrument provides that there is to be no personal
liability. I t should be remembered that this was a family
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trust in which family members were holding the assets
and engaged in the management of the corpus. Obviously, the settlor wanted to keep harmony within the family and insure that benefits were at the same time conferred upon the beneficiaries of the trust. The findings
of the trial court recognized that a secondary motivation
of the trust was an attempt to preserve a family empire
(R. 190). Since the settlor sought to name as trustees
persons who were not commercial trustees and to give
the broadest authority in managing the trust to such
persons, it is apparent that it was never intended by the
settlor to impose liability aginst the appellants in this
particular case. Such an intent is manifest from Article
V I I I . As noted in JDipo v. Dipo, supra, the terms of
the trust, unless illegal or against public policy, are
to govern. I n the instant case, there was no conversion
of the assets of the trust or self-dealing. There was only
the investment by inexpert members of a family in what
the court found to be speculative investments. The
testimony of respondents' expert was that the nature
of the investments were profitable for a time and then
their profitability ran out. As was noted in Harvard
College v. Amory, supra, risk investment is inescapable.
Putman, Judge, observed Id. at 460 "Do what you
will the capital is at hazard" and in Dickinson Appellant,
152 Mass. 184, 25 N . E . 99 (1890), it was observed:
The question of the lawfulness and fitness of
the investment is to be judged as of the time
when it was made and not by subsequent facts
which could not then have been anticipated. A
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trustee in this Commonwealth undoubtedly
finds it difficult to make satisfactory investments of trust property. The amount of funds
seeking investment is very large; the demand
for securities which are as safe as is possible
in the affairs of this world is small, when compared with the amount of money to be invested.
The language of the trust instrument in the instant
case would appear to impose substantial immunity as
against the claim of liability against the appellants.
Provisions in a trust exculpating the conduct of a
trustee are proper. Warren v. Fazolt, 203 Mass. 328,
89 N . E . 381 (1909); Restatement of Trusts 2d, § 222
(1). First, they could invest in any property whether
it was of the character permitted by law for the investment of trust funds. Consequently, the fact that the
investments were of conglomerates that were speculative
and lacked diversification would make no difference
under the trust instrument. Nor would the fact that the
investment was on margin be of concern. Margin investments are not against public policy and are not
illegal and are common in the investment market. See
Comment, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 103 (1967). Margin investments are controlled and thus sanctioned by Section
7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
78g (Supp. IV 1969) and Regulation T and U of the
Federal Reserve Board. Jennings and Marsh, Securities
Regulation, 2d ed. p. 800-802. "Payment of calls" is
expressly mentioned in the trust instrument. Such
language is common to margin investment. Thus, the
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trust instrument implicity sanctions margin investment
which was reasonably common even before the execution
of the trust instrument. Comment, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev.
103-105. Therefore, the appellants are excluded from
liability by the language in the trust instrument.
Second, the trustees were to be under no personal
liability in respect to any securities at any time under
the trust authority. In effect, this provision is to exculpate the trustees from liability for investment choices
that may later prove to be unwise or even risky. I n In
re Greenhouses Estate, 12 A. 2d 96 (Pa. 1940), the
trust instrument read as follows:
The trustees shall only be responsible for the
exercise of reasonably prudent business judgment. They shall not be responsible for any
loss occasioned through any investment or reinvestment, or for any loss occurring through
a so-called hazardous investment made by and
with the consent of the settlor.
The court concluded as follows:
I t does seem to be futile to undertake to examine through the glasses of an expert the
methods of a trustee who holds a patent of
authority like this, and to call him to account
for what we may even believe to be folly, if it
stops short of fraud, when the testator has expressly absolved him from accountability.
Third, and finally, Article V I I I provides that all
acts in good faith are conclusive on all parties and inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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terests. Such language should preclude recovery for investments made in good faith with full participation of
the then beneficiaries. In re Cowles' Will, 255 N.Y.S.
2d 567 (N.Y. App. 1965) aff. 215 N . E . 2d 509. In the
trial court's remarks at the end of the presentation of
evidence (R. 562) it was stated:
I think all trustees are held to a standard of
what in fact, everything they do know and
everything they should know, constructively.
. . . because no trustee is excused from the exercise of ordinary care and ordinary diligence.
The court was questioned as to whether he found any
dishonesty on the part of John Dussault (R. 576) and
replied "Dishonesty only to the extent that he knew this
was not the way he was supposed to run a trust by then."
Although the court found bad faith, it did so on the
basis of gross inattentiveness which it concluded was the
equivalent of bad faith (R. 197, 11 14). The record does
not support either finding of gross inattentiveness or
bad faith. At best, the record will support speculative
stock investment, and as can be seen from Point of this
brief, much of the court's conclusion is predicated on the
court's own sophistication, not the evidence of the record. The evidence of record shows consultation with
numerous investment counselors and stockbrokers, the
actual submission of the trust instrument to Dean Witter
and Company, the purchase of stocks rated by Standard
and Poor and an effort to maximize the growth of the
trust corpus which was respondents' predecessor's deDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sire as was the expressed desire of the life beneficiary.
At best, the evidence would only support a finding that
some of the investments were speculative. This is insufficient to make out illegal investment, investments contrary to public policy or in the terms of the trust instrument bad faith. There is not one scintilla of evidence to show inattentiveness. I n fact, the evidentiary
findings of the court do not show inattentiveness. The
only trustees who were actively managing the trust
were appellants. The trial court's findings of omission
were against Donald Bowman, not the appellants. I t
is respectfully submitted that as a matter of law when
the trust instrument is viewed against the evidence of
this record on appeal, that there is insufficient evidence
to sustain the judgment.
What has been said with reference to the trust instrument on the question of liability for investment
policy is equally applicable to the claim of lack of diversion. First National Bank v. Hyde, 363 S.W. 2d 647
(Mo. 1962); Annotation 24 A L R 3d 730, 753. The
broad latitude the trust instrument accorded the trustees so far as investments are concerned would exonerate
them from any liability for failure to diversify. Diversification is not a requisite where the trust instrument
contemplates that the trustee may invest the property
as their own and in effect are liable only for bad faith.
Warren v. Pazolt, supra; North Adams National Bank
v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N . E . 217 (1932).
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the
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trust instrument immunizes the appellants from liability. Trust instruments similar in nature to that in the
instant case are often drawn so as to substantially limit
the liability of trustees to family trusts where it is contemplated that relatives of limited experience will have
the management responsibility of the trust. To construe the evidence in light of the trust instrument as
imposing liability in this case would be to defeat the intention of the settlor.
POINT II
T H E T R I A L C O U R T E R R E D I N TAKING J U D I C I A L NOTICE OF T H E
ECONOMIC E N V I R O N M E N T A N D
OPERATION OF CONGLOMERATE
C O R P O R A T I O N S I N T H E 1960s A N D
THAT ANY INTELLIGENT PERSON
W O U L D NOT P U R C H A S E CERTAIN
C O N G L O M E R A T E STOCKS D U R I N G
T H E TIME IN QUESTION.
After the conclusion of the presentation of evidence
and after both sides had rested the trial judge purporting to act under authority of Rule 9, Utah Rules of
Evidence ( U R E ) stated he proposed to take judicial
notice "of what happened to the conglomerate in 1960's
and I'll state what I believe it to be. . ." (Tr. 361). The
trial judge stated the source of judicial notice to be "a
recent reading of the Wall Street Journal." The judge
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then proceeded to ntice, among other things, the following:
1. The manner in which conglomerate corporations acquired companies including the
general financial, accounting and tax writeoff practices, and tax bracket of corporations.
2. The form of consideration given for corporate acquisitions.
3. That such practices resulted in L.T.V.
(Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.) owing "hundreds of millions of dollars" more for assets
than they were worth. (Evidence had previously been received that the trust had
acquired L.T.V. securities.)
4. That writers were predicting that mergers
would reduce the number of stocks on the
New York Stock Exchange to ten within
ten years (Tr. 362), and that "almost every
stock on the stock exchange either enjoyed
some type of merging and diversification. . . "
5.

That ". . . volatile continuation of the tax
structure brought on long-term capital
gains" so that benefit could be received
f r o m conglomerate acquisitions. The
necessity "to enjoy reasonably a good business era so they could pay their debts." The
hope to "enjoy the continued laxity of government tax auditing." That the failure of
such factors noticed "could have brought
down the conglomerates; that the conglom-
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erates insofar as their stock values were
concerned were destroyed primarily by
political pressures against further mergers
and by improved tax auditing."
6. From 1968 to 1970, the "Federal Governernment issued regulations against mergers,
filed actions against mergers," prevented
mergers of corporations with sales over 100
million a year. That such action "brought
conglomerate stocks down," and "the
dream of rapid growth" was destroyed.
7. That the diversification of the present trust
portfolio in Gulf and Western and L.T.V.
stocks did not exist because it was "totally dependent upon political favors."
8. What destroyed conglomerates was "all the
business executives and the Republican
Party eventually realized that the merger
of all of these companies would cause a complete shift to all corporate executive positions and the pressure brought by the
Federal Government affected the stock,
and this is what happened through the
sixties. I t is well known, and under rule
nine the court takes judicial notice that
this is what happened to the stocks.
Any intelligent person through this
period would not consider the purchase of
L.T.V. and Gulf and Western as a diversification because they depended on the
same factors for success."
These oral expressions of judicial notice were
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carried over Paragraph 8 of the court's "Findings of
Fact" where the court observed:
"The court believes these facts to be of general
knowledge not reasonably subject to dispute,
and capable of accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources."
Again, the court cited its "principal source of information the Wall Street Journal. . ." The court then found:
"A conglomerate would offer to buy another
company for more than the actual value of
that company. This was possible because of the
permissive accounting procedures of that
period; the conglomerate could write off as a
tax deduction many of the costs of the purchase, in effect the tax saving to the purchaser
was buying the new company. Also, the buying and selling of corporations or their stocks
in the light of loose accounting for the period
permitted the transfer of large earnings to
capital gains reports or time-wise fixing tax
losses. Purchasing of stock and their own
stock in large blocks permitted what amounted
to price fixing of stocks or securities. The purchase was generally effected by a transfer of
stocks, bonds and indentures and warrants were
often used. In this way a large conglomerate
could owe more for the assets than the assets
were worth, but as long as business conditions
and tax practices continued, and federal regulations remained favorable the conglomerate
could successfully operate and continue to
acquire other companies.
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These companies had much in common.
They depended for their existence upon continuation of the existing tax structure, a
reasonably good business climate, and continued laxity of federal tax auditing standards
and market manipulation of stocks or securities.
The failure of any of these conditions would
seriously affect the value of all of the conglomerates. Any knowledgeable person would have
realized that investment in conglomerates was
not by itself diversification. Even though different business were involved, their stock prices
and variations paralleled one another to an
extremely high degree. The conglomerates were
usually 'leveraged' to the maximum. They
were therefore highly speculative, and while
this could hold some of their stock, to further
'leverage' by placing them on the margin constituted misconduct and this includes the stock
of Gulf & Western."
I t is submitted the court acted improperly in taking
judicial notice of substance of the court's statements
and in making a finding thereon and procedurally in
the action itself.
Rule 9 provides for three situations in which the
court may by judicial notice of matters of general
knowledge obtain evidence in support of a judgment.
Rule 9(1) provides that judicial notice shall be taken
"of such specific facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot
reasonably be the subject of dispute." That provision
would seem to make mandatory that a trial judge conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sider those items as that are so obvious that they are,
without question, uncontestable. Such a fact might be
that the State of Utah is one of the fifty States of the
United States. Section 9(2) provides that judicial notice
may be taken without request by a party of "(d) such
facts as are so generally known or of such common
notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute,
and (e) specific facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of
indisputable accuracy." The third situation is the same
as 9(2) (d) and (e) but upon request of a party. 9(3)
U.R.E.
The trial judge purported to use language similar
to Rule 9 in taking judicial notice of the material above
described and in making his finding. I t is submitted
that Rule 9 so far as the specific facts as are so generally
known or of such common notoriety that they cannot
be reasonably subject to dispute or generalized knowledge capable of immediate and accurate determination
is using terminology very comparable to that expressed
in Little Cottonwood Water Company v. Kent, 76 Utah
243, 289 Pac. 116 (1930) at page 267, where this court
noted that matters of general geography, history, agricultural conditions and matters of common knowledge
could be the subject of judicial notice. "In short, the
court is presumed to know what every man of ordinary
intelligence must know about such things." I t is submitted that the action of the court in taking judicial
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notice of the variant and detailed matters that were
noticed in the instant case in effect exceeded the standard demonstrated in Rule 9 and made the Wall Street
Journal a hearsay expert witness.
It is submitted that the trial court confused the
concept of judicial notice with judicial knowledge. In
Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2569, 3rd Edition, it
is observed:
" There is a real but elusive line between the
judge's personal knowledge as a private man
and these matters of which he takes judicial
notice as a judge. The latter does not necessarily include the former; as a judge, indeed,
he may have to ignore what he knows as a man,
and contrariwise.
"It is therefore plainly accepted that the
judge is not to use from the bench, under the
guise of judicial knowledge, that which he
knows only as an individual observed outside
of court. The former is in truth 'known' to
him merely in the fictional sense that it is
known and notorious to all men, and the
dilemma is only the result of using the term
'knowledge' in two senses. Where to draw the
line between knowledge by notoriety and
knowledge by personal observation may sometimes be difficult, but the principle is plain."
Even though a judge may have expertise in a particular
area, he cannot, himself, become a witness in the proDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ceedings and use his expertise through the concept of
judicial notice to bolster a finding. Bervid v. The Taw
Commission, 247 Iowa 1333, 78 N . W . 2d 812 (1956).
In Miranne v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 54 So.2d 538 (La. App. 1951), the court ruled
that the trial judge was in error in taking notice that a
certain street in New Orleans had heavy automobile
traffic. The court stated judicial knowledge is limited
to what a judge may properly know in his judicial
capacity. Cf. In re Duarte, 331 Mass. 747,122 N . E . 2d
890 (1954); Castello v. Cassidy, 210 N.Y. Supp. 2d 46
(1960). In State v. Martel, 122 Ver. 421, 177 A.2d
236 (1962), the court ruled that the internal affairs of
a private corporation could not be properly judicially
noticed. I n the instant case, the trial judge took judicial
notice of the financial status of L.T.V. Corporation
which could only involve notice of its internal financial
structure. I t is hardly a matter of common knowledge
to the public at large. The United States Congress
Committee of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives did not feel that the matter concerning L.T.V.,
Inc. was a matter of such common knowledge as would
allow them to legislate concerning conglomerates without taking substantial evidence from numerous witnesses. The Committee held hearings before the House
Antitrust Subcommittee on the Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations Serial Number 91-23 Part 6,
91s£ Congress, 2nd Session 1970, which was devoted
to consideration of Ling-Temco-Vought. The printed
investigation dealing with mergers and acquisitions runs
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781 pages. Under such circumstances, it could hardly
be said that the action of the trial court was in keeping
with the concept that judicial notice will be taken of
matters of common knowledge as distinct from what
experties the trial judge may have acquired in his own
day-today association with the world finance.
I n In re Phillips Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 P.2d 699
(1935), the court held that judicial notice could not be
taken in probate proceedings that certain streets were
in a certain city and their location to one another. If
something of that nature is not the subject of judicial
notice, how can the whole ambit of conglomerate operations be of such common knowledge. Miller v. Southern
Pacific Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P.2d 865 (1933).
In Walker Brothers v. Skilirs, 43 Utah 353, 98
Pac. 114 (1908), this court refused to take judicial
notice of different systems of bookkeeping. Certainly,
if judicial notice of such a matter is prohibited judicially
noticing a means of corporate acquisition by conglomerates in general or tax accounting methods and their
income position is beyond that of a trial court. Salt Lake
City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 Pac. 442 (1911).
Nor does the fact that Rule 9 authorizes judicial notice
of a fact that is readily verifiable apply in this instance.
The facts which the court took judicial notice of that
led to the conclusion that no reasonable man would
invest in conglomerates for diversification is hardly a
matter that can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
The hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
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expertise the trial judge may have acquired in his own
Committee of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 91st Congress on Gulf and Western Industries,
Inc., a corporation which the trial court took judicial
notice as to its internal activities and financial condition
runs 819 pages and involves substantial detailed information concerning the corporation. The overall proceedings on conglomerate corporations conducted by the
House of Representatives run into seven volumes and in
excess of 7000 pages, testimony and exhibits. I t could
hardly be said that the conclusions reached by the court
are readily ascertainable. See 1 Jones on Evidence, Section 2:3 and 2:4. The matter in which the trial court took
judicial notice can hardly be within the common knowledge generally of persons in the State of Utah nor
readily ascertainable by resort to "easily accessible
sources of indisputable accuracy." McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Ed. Section 330, page 763.
Further, it is necessary to distinguish between what
may be legislatively known and what are adjudicative
facts. Legislative facts may be a part of the judicial
arsenal in giving consideration to the adoption of new
laws or the expression of new legal policies, but are not
adjudicative facts which may be noticed relating to an
incident which may give rise to a lawsuit. McCormick
on Evidence, 3rd Ed. Section 331, page 767. As the
court observed in Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321,
229 N.W. 138 (1930)". .. we cannot take judicial notice
of such facts as are known only by an especially informed
class of persons." The evidence noticed in this case is
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hardly scientific fact capable of ready ascertainment
known to a community of scholors.
In addition, it is submitted that even if the matter
noticed by the court were the proper subject for judicial
notice that the procedure employed by the court was not
proper under the circumstances. The parties had rested
their case and the matter was in effect submitted subject
to additional memoranda. The court indicated that it
intended to take judicial notice of the items noted above
and that the parties could put in their memoranda their
disagreement with the court's action. The court referred
to its informational base as being a "recent article" in
the Wall Street Journal. How recent or the date of the
article was not specified. Rule 10, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that the court shall afford each party
reasonable opportunity to present information relevant
to the propriety of judicial notice and allows, under
Rule 10(2) (a), in determining the propriety of taking
a judicial notice, the judge to consult any source of
pertinent information. The source is not to be evidence
itself but only to determine the propriety of taking
judicial notice. Further, the information must convince
the judge that the matter falls clearly within his perogratives under Rule 9, Rule 10(3) Utah Rules of
Evidence. In the instant case, the trial judge used a
hearsay newspaper article as an expert witness against
the defendants. This court in promulgating the Utah
Rules of Evidence did not adopt the provisions of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(31) on learned
treatises which would allow judicial notice to prove the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
truth of a matter by published treatises, periodicals or
pamplets on history, science or art. Even if this court
had that rule, it would not cover the instant situation.
Nor does § 78-25-6 U.C.A. 1953, apply to newspaper
articles. The Wall Street Journal can hardly be called
a book of science, art or historical work. Since the newspaper article itself would be inadmissible in evidence,
it was not proper for the trial court under the guise of
judicial notice to accept such matter as evidence. Anno.
55 A L R 3rd 663; Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d
790 (2nd Cir. 1962). The court in effect made a hearsay
newspaper article and his own reading an expert witness
against appellants not subject to cross-examination. In
the instant case, the effect of the court's erroneous
taking of judicial notice was to sum up appellant's
conglomerate ventures as a basis for liability. The respondents own expert witness testified that Gulf and
Western had a B + rating based on Standard and Poor's
rating system and that the purchase of such stock would
be reasonable as a part of a total portfolio (T. 158159). The court's judicial notice finding apparently was
the basis for a contrary conclusion. The finding made
by the court was directly related to the judgment later
entered. Under these circumstances, the action was
clearly reversible error.
POINT III
T H E T R I A L COURT COMMITTED
ERROR IN IMPOSING L I A B I L I T Y
AGAINST T H E APPELANTS AND
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IN FAVOR OF T H E R E S P O N D E N T S
SINCE W I L L I A M BOWMAN E X E CUTED A RELEASE OF LIABILITY
AGAINST T H E APPELLANTS.
William Bowman was the father of the respondents.
H e was not a trustee but was one of the beneficiaries
of the trust. Bowman had been consulted from time to
time on investments and because of some difficulties
within the family was sometimes antagonistic to the
appellants. Mr. Bowman contacted the Dussaults and
indicated he was in financial difficulty and needed some
money (R. 538). H e indicated that he was sorry to have
caused trouble but did need to borrow some money. H e
indicated to the Dussaults that he would be glad to sign
any kind of instrument releasing the Dussaults from
any liability with reference to the trust. Defendants'
exhibit 6 is a realease and confirmation signed by William Bowman, the Dussaults and Donald Bowman and
purported to release the Dussaults of all claims against
the Dussaults as a result of their actions as trustees.
The release acknowledges that William Bowman had
full opportunity to review all transactions relating to
the trust. Further, William Bowman did not allege
that the appellants had ever been guilty of negligence
or wrongdoing with reference to the trust but expressly
confirmed that the appellants had acted at all times in
a proper manner. William Bowman was an attorney and
was well aware of the effect of the document he signed.
The release and confirmation was executed May 4,1970,
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subsequent to the actions which the court found had given
rise to the respondents' claims for relief. I t is submitted
that the release acted as a release of liability and a confirmation of what had been done and that respondents
are bound by the release. The respondents are simply
contingent beneficiaries. They stand to receive what
their father would have received had he survived. Under
such circumstances, it is submitted that the respondents'
position with reference to the trust is in privity with the
actions that their father took. Section 217(1) of the
Restatement of Trusts 2d provides:
A beneficiary may preclude himself from
holding the trustees liable for a breach of trust
by a release or contract effective to discharge
the trustee's liability to him for that breach.
The Restatement of Trusts 2d § 218(1) provides:
Except as stated in Subsection (2), if the
trustee in breach of trust enters into a transaction which the beneficiary can at his option
reject or affirm, and the beneficiary affirms
the transaction, he cannot thereafter reject it
and hold the trustee liable for any loss occurring after the trustee entered into the transaction.
Defendants' Exhibit 6 constituted a release and confirmation of the actions of the appellants. I t was executed
by a professional man knowledgeable in what he was
doing after having had an opportunity to thoroughly
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
review the investment activities of the appellants. I n
54 Am.Jur., Trusts § 379 it is stated:
The general rule that approval, consent, or
ratification by a beneficiary, who is an adult
sui juris, of a step or transaction in the administration of a trust, made freely, or acquiescense thereto for a long time, with full knowledge of all pertinent facts and circumstances,
operates as an estoppel, waiver, or preclusion,
with respect to any right of the beneficiary to
object to the impropriety of such step or transaction, applies fully and is frequently invoked
with respect to the impropriety of trust investments, whether such impropriety lies in the
making, retention, or exchange of investments,
or whether it lies in the making of the investments in so-called 'nonlegal securities,' in the
taking of the investments in the name of the
trustee, or in other matters.
The trial court in Finding No. 10 (R. 195) found that
the release was not a valid release on behalf of Bowman's
heirs, the respondents herein. I t is submitted that the
above doctrine should be applied in instances where the
ultimate beneficiaries are merely contingent and take
per stripes. The motivation behind the release is immaterial if it is made knowingly when not under incapacity. The facts and circumstances of record in this
case show that Bowman approached the appellants
seeking the release in excange for a loan. Under such
circumstances, the release and confirmation immunizes
the appellants from any liability to Bowman or those
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who are in privity to his action. An individual is in
privity with another when there is a mutual or successive
relationship to the same rights of property. Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th ed. p. 1361. A derivative interest
founded on or growing out of contract, connection or
bond of union between the parties is sufficient. It is
submitted that in the instant case respondents were in
privity of estate with the interests of William Bowman
and that the release and confirmation executed by William Bowman should preclude liability in the instant
action.
P O I N T IV
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N NOT
A L L O W I N G A P P E L L A N T S TO O F F SET GAINS AGAINST LOSSES IN
D E T E R M I N I N G T H E MEASURE OF
DAMAGES.
Assuming that the trial court's findings of liability
are upheld by this court, it is submitted that reversal is
still required. The trial court did not allow the appellants to offset gains to the estate as against losses. The
evidence discloses that appellants, as trustees, engaged
in margin investments from about 1965 (R. 300). The
trial court computed the damages in the instant case
against the appellants based upon the years 1968, 1969
and 1970 (R. 195). No allowances were made for gains
from the same investments in prior years or during the
same years (Exhibit D ) . The court imposed damages
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based upon a finding of mismanagement for the amount
of the losses to the investment portfolio without reference to whether a profit had been made from the investment practices. I t is submitted that such a measure of
damages was inappropriate in the instant case. The
testimony of respondents' expert, Robert Gevens, was
to the effect that there was a need to diversify and that
the type of investment was proper only if following a
very aggressive approach (R. 354, 356). H e also acknowledged that there had been a profit in the years
1965 through 1967 to as much as $200,000 by purchasing
on the margin (R. 375, 376). The trial court, however,
accepted only the loss years for calculating damages
even though the testimony of respondents' expert was
to the effect that the investment practices simply continued beyond the profitable period (R. 376). I t is
submitted that this is not a proper standard for measuring the damages and that appellants should have been
allowed to offset their gains as against their losses since
a trustee is not an insurer of the trust investment. In
re Listmans Estate, 57 Utah 471, 197 Pac. 596 (1921).
A. Gains Against

Losses

The general rule is stated in the Restatement of
Trusts 2d I 213:
A trustee who is liable for a loss occasioned by
one breach of trust cannot reduce the amount
of his liability by deducting the amount of a
gain which was accrued through another and
distinct breach of trust; but if the two breaches
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of trust are not distinct, the trustee is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only
with the net loss resulting therefrom. (Emphasis added).
It should be noted that normally a trustee who has incurred liability by reason of a breach of duty regarding
investments cannot reduce his liability by demonstrating
that other separate legal or illegal conduct resulted in
a profit for the trust. Bogart, Trusts and Trustees, 2d
ed. § 708. However, as the Restatement acknowledges
and will be seen hereinafter in certain instances applicable to the instant case, gains can be credited against
losses, Thus, the Restatements position acknowledges
that if the breaches of trust are not distinct, the trustee
is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only
with the net loss resulting therefrom. In Comment (1),
the Restatement of Trusts 2d observes:
If property is improperly purchased by the
trustee and is subsequently sold, and the proceeds are used in purchasing other property
in breach of trust, the trustee is accountable
only for the net profit or is chargeable only
with the net loss if the purchases are not distinct breaches of trust. Thus, if the trustee,
erroneously believing that he can properly
invest trust funds in the purchase of land, purchases a farm which he sells at a profit and with
the proceeds immediately purchases another
farm which he sells at a loss, he is accountable
only for the net profit or chargeable only with
the net loss. Conversely, if the first farm were
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sold at a loss and the second farm at a profit,
the trustee is accountable only for the net profit
or is chargeable only with the net loss.
This is in accord with the general principle that where
the breach of trust is of one investment activity, gains
may be set off against losses. A similar conclusion is
reached in Comment (j) of the Restatement of Trusts
2d where it is observed:
If the trustee in breach of trust continues to
carry on the business of the testator and for a
time makes a profit but thereafter incurs
losses, leaving a small profit at the end of the
period, he is liable only for the ultimate profit;
he is not chargeable with the intermediate
profit without deducting the subsequent loss.
I n Mclnnes v. Goldthwaite, 94 N . H . 331, 52 A.2d
795 (1947) the court observed :
The trustee who has incurred liability by reason
of a breach of duty regarding investments
cannot reduce that liability by proving that he
has made a profit for the trust by other separate legal or illegal conduct in the trust administration. . . . But a different situation arises if
the trustee violates his investment obligations
by means of a single act which to some extent
produces losses and in other ways results in
gains, and it is sought to hold the trustee liable
for the losses and also to take from him the
gains, whereas the trustee asserts that the transaction should be viewed as a whole and that he
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should be credited with gains which he can offset against the damages which accrued.
See also Restatement of Trusts 2d § 213 ( f ) :
There are other situations also in which the
losses may be setoff against the gains on the
ground that there are not separate and distinct
breaches of trust. Thus if the trustee in breach
of trust purchases at one time several securities of the same general character, and subsequently sells some of them at a profit and
others at a loss he is accountable only for the
net profit or is chargeable with the net loss.
The argument is most persuasive that losses ought
not to be treated separate from gains. As is observed in
Buer, Qualified Trustee Performance, 99 Trusts and
Estates, 194-195 (1960):
One of the greatest handicaps to prudent trust
investment procedure is inability of trustees
to present both sides of a transaction in justifying sale of purchase. Insistence by the courts
that each transaction stand on its own feet is
inconsistent with good investment principles
and practices. I t penalizes diversification, the
basic principle of which is that gains will offset
an occasional inevitable loss.
The effect of a contrary rule in the instant case would
be to allow the trustee to have invested in mutual funds
that purchased the exact same stocks purchased by the
trustees without incurring liability; but if they purDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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chased the same stocks purcliased by the mutual fund
without going through the mutual fund, gains could not
he setoff as against iubbuD. Comment, 1972 U . of 111.
f ,'iw Forum 784.
I n the instant ease, i! is submitted the appellants
'-^ild he allo\\<d lo ofiesi I in- losses from the years
s through 1970 as against the gains mad* m the same
of invrshnenf actively <*md similar investment
practices in prioi ) ears since they were a p a r t of the
same investment activity involving one single policy.
I n Bogart, Trust mid Trustees, 2d < i:l § 708 p. IW
it is observed:
T

i.. question regarding the law as
to pi til it ^ ;III.I i-vses from separate, distinct
transactions m \\\wA\ the trustee engages,
whether they are uii noniegai or 11e p a r t l y
legal and parti}' n<mlegal. B u t a different
situation arises if the trustee violates his investment obligations by means of a single act
which to some extent produces losses and in
other ways results in gains, and it is sought
to hold the trustee liable for the losses and also
to take from him the gains, whereas the trustee
asserts that the transaction should be viewed
as a whole and that he should be credited with
gains which he can offset against the damages
whi«"h acrrnrd
• •r example, suppose a truster violates
his trust by purchasing a! KAW lime and from
the same seller a block of speculative stock, and
later at various times he sells the io L \n
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some cases at a loss and in other instances at
a gain, Or let it be assumed that his breach
consists of the purchase of a tract of land,
a part of which is sold at a loss, but that oil
is discovered on the remainder of the land
later and this enables the trustee to sell the
rest of the realty at a greatly advanced price,
so that the whole transaction is highly advantageous to the beneficiaries.
I t would seem here that the cestui must
choose between repudiating the transaction
and treating it as unlawful, or on the other
hand electing to treat it as valid as a whole,
and that he cannot disaffirm the act of the
trustee in part and treat it as valid in part.
And if he takes the first choice the damages
flowing from the breach should be based on the
net effect of the operation.
Since the trial court did not apply the appropriate standard of damages or even give consideration in the
findings as to whether under the rules above expressed
gains should be setoff as against losses, it is submitted
that a new trial is warranted. The evidence clearly
demonstrates that the trial court found the entire portfolio to have been improperly managed in the particular
years before referenced (R. 195).
POINT V
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N IMPOSING LIABILITY AGAINST T H E
APPELLANTS FOR T H E
RENO
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R A N (' J i - A 111 IU > 111'
T K AN S A C T K )N
S I N C E (A) T H E M A T T i i R W A S N O T
P R O P E R L Y R A I S E D (H) R E S P O N D E N T S H A D NO S T A N D I N G
TO
COMPLAIN
(C) T H E
EVIDENCE
W A S I N S U F F I C I E N T TO SUSTAIN
T H E J U D G M E N T A N D (D) STATU T E O F L I M I T A T I O N S IT A D E X PIRED.
The trial court imposed liability against the appellants for a transaction between Estella W a t t i s Bowman,
one of the trustees to the trust and the life beneficiary,
and J o h n Dussault, also a trustee. I n 1961, appellant
.John Dussault traded property known as the airport
property fti Keno. Nevada to Estella W a t t i s Bowman
in exchange for property that .she mwk-d known as the
Reno Ranch property. The transaction u ^ independent
of the trust and neither the Reno Ran eh propeit\ nor
the airport property was at the time in any way connected with the trust. Mrs. Bowman subsequently transferred the airport property to the trust in 1964 (R. 340).
The trial e o u r <n a.* unsupportable conclusion found
that J o h n Dussauli misled Estella W a t t i s Bowman as
to the value of the property being exchanged (R. ; *r .
H i s finding was apparently that Mr. Dussault misled
Mrs. Bowman as to the value of her own property, and
that although the propeiiy had !;een appraised U*r
$95,000 that shortly after I he exchange Mr. Du.vsault
was aide lu sell tin i^"-!i^' '"• b{ revcived for appmxi-
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mately $120,000 and that, therefore, he should be accountable for the difference between the $120,000 and
the value of the property he gave to Mrs. Bowman.
The property which was exchanged for the Ranch property was income producing property and provided Mrs.
Bowman with approximately $750 to $1000 per month
income whereas the Ranch property produced only
enough money to cover the taxes of the property. The
court found that since Mrs. Bowman subsequently
transferred the airport property to the trust in 1964
that by reason of the transaction the trust suffered a
loss of $24,200 (R. 197). The court also found that at
the time of the transaction, Mrs. Bowman was fully
competent (R. 197). With these findings, the court
allowed the contingent beneficiaries of the trust to maintain a cause of action in their own name to recover from
John Dussault the profit he made when he subsequently
sold the property he had received from Mrs. Bowman.
I t is submitted that this matter was not properly raised
by the pleadings, that the respondents have no cause
of action arising out of the transaction, that the evidence
is insufficient to establish a claim for relief and that
the statute of limitations on any claim for relief has run.
A.

The Matter was not Properly Raised.

Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
provides:
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind.
I n all averments of fraud or mistake, the cir-
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eumslair.V; eoir,i;Uuin:^' 1'rauu or mistake snail
be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, ami ofber condition *»!' neud of a
person i m v be avi rred generally.,
I.i ilk" instant <av ih«- complaint, aim-ruled complaint,
and complaint In intervention in no uay plead fraud
with any degree of particularity. Tne Heno Ranch-Airport property transaction was not even mentioned in the
pleadings. Consequently, it is submitted that since the
pleadings fail to adequately plead fraud that no action
MI such a theory can he sustained by the status of the
record in the instant -aase. Heathman V. Hatch. 13 Utah
2d 266, 372 J ' . ^ I : m (1962); Heathman :
luthmu.
14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2< 1 189 (1 962;, Although ii.pretrial order mentions the Reno Ranch matter in ilkcontentions of the plaintiffs (R. 119, 121) that does
not take the place of a proper pleading. Rule 16, Utah
Rules of ( n i l Procedure provides that the pretrial order
•Jiall indicali ih/' amendments allowed u, the pleadings
or the agreements made by iln partic:-. ^ to \\w matters
considered. The pretrial order contains no agreements
as to the parties, no statement of agreed facts with reference to this issue and no amendments to the pleadings.
Consequently, if respondents are to maintain their recowry agjim>i the appellants, it must be on the basis
of the tlieory plead m UK; amended complaint that assets
of "thr trust estate" were lost by neglect and the failure
to properly discharge the duties of trustee (R. I : '•. Since
this was not the case as to this issue, the judgment must
be reduced.
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B. The Respondents are Without Standing with
Reference to the Reno Ranch Transaction.
It is submitted that the respondents have no standing or any right to recover with reference to the transfer
of the airport property for the Reno Ranch property.
The transfer was not a part of the trust and it was not
until 1964, some three years after the transfer, that the
property involved which was the property of Mrs. Bowman, was actually given over to the trust. If there was
any wrongdoing, it was directed at Mrs. Bowman, not
at the trust. She, if anyone, would have a cause of action
or her estate would have a cause of action. The beneficiaries of the trust are only entitled to the assets of the
trust or damages from trust mismanagement not unrelated claims. See generally, 54 Am.Jur., Trusts § 378.
They are not entitled to represent Mrs. Bowman's
estate for any action it might have against appellants.
The pretrial order recited as one of the appellants' contentions that appellants as heirs of law of Estella Wattis
Bowman were entitled to directly sue to recover for the
estate the losses of their ancestor. (R. 121). Such a
contention is without merit. The person who has the
power to represent the estate of Estella Wattis Bowman is the executor or administrator of that estate.
§ 75-11-3, 4, 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The assets
of any action brought by the estate would have to be
distributed in accordance with the will of the deceased,
if there was one, or by intestate succession. The appellants as contingent beneficiaries of a specific trust have
no general right to represent the estate.
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Fiiriho
\w instant a^Uun were deemed U> •«.
on.- tti' fraud m the Reno Ranch transaction whether
UM- la"<* «>f r i a l ) or ih^ ;.,v- -tj' .Nevada i.s applied, both
States recognize the general applicability of the English
Common Law. $ f>:*-.'M. O a h i*ode Annotated, 1953;
§ 1.030 Nevada Revised Statutes. A t common law,
actions in fraud do not survive the death of the defrauded
party. I n 1 A m . J u r . 2d Abatement, § 92, it is stated:
A t common law, according to the general rule
p ^3use "f action for frai id or deceit does n< )t

T

"

1

''Ts

Abatement

and Revival

§ 1 k,\ it Is stated:

A t common iav. a *4anse of nrilwn fur I'nt.in and
deceit does nol MHMVC the dc;dh of either
o:^ty. See also II cash aw v. Miller, 17 How.
i' 212 (1854)
li

i.s s u o i r n U ' d

tha1

;!is ;

* a u s e of a ( l i " n

inai

Kslclla

Wattis Bowman might h a w had. to the extent u-d -,\
is predicated upon fraud, ended at the time of her death.
Jliven so, respondents could not claim the cause of action
§ 75-11-4, U t a h Code Anne)tated, 1953. It is only ilu
barest speculation to assume that Mrs. Bowman might
;
:av. donated am recovery dial she might have had in
an action agamsl John l)u-sand '..- (J.< t r u d . The n
spondents in this case are no; representatives of the
estate of Estella W a t t i s Bowman and since the transaction took place prior to any of the property going
into the trust and took place under circumstances where
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neither party was purporting to represent the trust with
no expression of donative intent made at the time of the
transaction, the respondents simply had no standing
with reference to any cause of action relating to the
transaction.
C.

Insufficiency of Evidence

In reference to the Reno-Airport property transaction, the trial court found "that John Dussault misled Estella Wattis Bowman in 1961 as to the value of
the property being exchanged." (R. 197). The court
also found that John Dussault's corporation received
$120,000 from the transaction and that Estella Wattis
Bowman received property in exchange of a value of
$95,800. The court found that by reason of the transaction the trust suffered a loss of $24,200. The court
noted that at the time of the transaction, Estella Bowman was fully competent (R. 197). I t is submitted
that there is no evidence to sustain any basis of recovery
by Estella Wattis Bowman against John Dussault out
of the transaction and that under the circumstances there
was no evidence to support a claim of liability in favor of
respondents against appellants. Donald Bowman, one
of the trustees, but not a trustee at the time of the transaction nor a person against whom liability was determined by the trial court arising out of the property
transaction, testified that the transaction was fully explained to him by John Dussault (R. 285). He, Bowman, felt that upon an explanation of the transaction
he could see nothing that was deterimental (R. 285).
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f i r ;ifkn'>'.ried#cu liiai tiie Reno Ranch transaction was
.-.•••I A ;MM! (»f the trust estate involved in the instant
litigation i H 2 H > ; . Tint litere was a direct trade of
tin- airj>orl io;id properly for ihe ranch property and that
three years later hi.s mother. Estella W a t t i s Bowman,
transferred the airport property to the trust estate (R.
z&i>). A t the time of the transfer, the airport property
was owned In Ji.lm Dussault and was making income
of $75o :: )i;ontIi (R. 430) and was not transferred to
\hi tn.Nf ut.;>l i!»bi ;H i\}\,. I he actual date of the
transfer o) the ranch property io the iro-f was J a n u a r y
28, nx;j. (Defendants Exhibit n "M^ transfer of
the property from Estella Bowman to appellant !>
Dussault's corporation was J u n e 22. I9<>] (Plaintiffs
Kxhihii L ) . The transfer of the ranch property for
the airport property was a straight across transfer (R.
32~j. „\i tin iim< the r:nuh properiv was not providing
much income - about enough to eover (axes -, t{. 111)/.
There was an appraisal made of the property transferred
by J o h n Dussault to Mrs. Bowman which was commercial property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit L ) . Donald Bowman.
William Bowman, Mrs. Dussault and Mrs. Bowman all
went to Reno to examine noils properties (R. 337) Mr.
Dussault testified iiia! :<n appraisal had been made of
Mrs. Bowman's property and thai sin ua- contacted
at the E l Cortez H o t e l and advised that the property
was worth approximately $88,000. The airport road
property appraisal was for $95,800 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
M : R. 339). At the time Mrs. Bowmsm wr<s strapped
lor

JilCOIIU

rio^

!l):

J",M'-'"

• O'fU-'

p ^ f r H ' . '

Wf)]|]i]

|)|-o~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52
vide her with income (R. 405). Mr. Dussault testified
that at the time the ranch was unproductive and that
he discussed the matter with real estate brokers and had
received evaluations from $90,000 to $110,000 (R. 335).
Mrs. Bowman, while fully competent, approached John
Dussault and requested the transfer of the property.
She was a woman capable of managing a sizeable estate
of her own and the trust involved in this litigation. The
trial court expressly found that she was an able and
strong willed woman (R. 192). There is not one scintilla of evidence to show any misrepresentation by John
Dussault as to the transaction. Mrs. Bowman had her
own appraisals and was certainly aware of the value of
her own property including the difficulties associated
with flooding of the property and the limited return
from it. The trial court, in effect, found liability upon
the part of John Dussault for misleading Estella Bowman as to the value of her own property although she
had gone to Reno and examined the property, consulted
independent individuals and herself requested the transfer. The property was subsequently sold to Dr. Tom
Mullis (Deposition of Tom Mullis, p. 3) and at the
time he received the property, it was renting for just
enough to pay the taxes (Deposition, p. 12). The market for the property was not active. I t is submitted that
under the evidence presented to the court as a matter
of law there is insufficient evidence to support the court's
findings of liability against John Dussault. I t should
be remembered that there was no fiduciary relationship
between the two and each were reasonably experienced
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in 'mvness anairs. 1 in <*• .-< :i - -. MU-. .> \ : :iw\
representation. Under tin law of both the State of
Nevada a n ; 'lit- State of I'tali, the e\ idence will •.- *
sustain a finding of liability based <>H ,m\ theory of
fraud assuming that this was the legal basis upon which
the coi irt acted.
Whether the evidence is evaluated under the law
of the State of Nevada where the transaction occurred
or under the State of Utah, the same standard is applicable to fraud cases. The respondents had to prove their
case by clear and convincing evidence. Nevada
Mining
and Exploration Co, v. Hae, 218 Par. ti\) i \ * \. 192:*) :
Ward v, Scheeline Banking <<nd TIU*I Company
Ti
P.2d 358 (Nev. 1933) ; HHVUH v. Alger, 461 P.2d 857
(Nev. 1969); Chammui v. Troy Laundry, 47 P.2d 1054
( U t a h 1935); liavoson r. Hardy, 88 Utah 131, 48 J\2<1
473 (1935); Universal CIT v. Schom, id L'lah 2d 202,
381 P.2d 293 (1964). Respondents had the duty to prove
any fraud of the appellant- * y more than a mere preponderance. I t had to be dear, convincing and satisfactory. W h e r e there is no evidence of anything other than
a subsequent transfer of the property after J o h n D u s sault received the same from Mrs. Bowman with the
transfer being at a higher value from that which he
paid i'^r il, f;."ti<! i- not established. Under both the law
of the State of U t a h and the law of the State of Nevada,
fraud will not be presumed. Havas v. Alger, supra, p .
880 P.2d.; Lane v. Peterson, 68 U t a h 585, 251 P a c .
374 (1926). N o r is it presumed where there is a reasonable explanation other than, that of fn> ».* \ !>'* * . I ..*
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Ozocerite, 38 Utah 367, 113 Pac. 1038 (1911). The
evidence of record shows that John Dussault dealt at
arms length and that he did not have any collusive dealings with his subsequent vendor. The explanation is
simply that John Dussault was able to find a buyer for
property that he did not need but would return a profit
for him in exchange for property transferred to Mrs.
Bowman that satisfied her needs for cash income and
was of reasonably comparable value. The mere fact that
profit is made in a subsequent or contemporaneous
transfer of the exchanged property does not make out
fraud. Even assuming John Dussault had given his
opinion of the value of the property at less than what
he believed it to be, this would be insufficient to sustain
a claim of fraud under the law of the State of Nevada.
In Clark Sanitation, Inc. v. Sun Valley Disposal Co.,
487 P.2d 337 (Nev. 1971), the court observed:
This is the basis for the frequently announced
rule that a charge of fraud normally may not
be based upon representations of value. In a
differing context Nevada has recognized that
expressions of opinion as distinguished from
representations of fact, may not be the predicate for a charge of fraud (citations omitted).
This is in accord with the law as it has been in the
majority of jurisdictions in this country for some time.
In Lilienthal v. Suffolk Brewing Co., 54 Mass. 185,
28 N . E . 151 (1891) in an opinion by Mr. Justice
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Holmes, then of the Massachusetts Si ipreme Court, it
was observed:
N e x t as to fraud. P i m m facie, a statement
to an experienced dealer in hops as to the
market value of the article he is asked to buy
is dealer's talk on a subject about which the
seller has a right to assume that the buyer will
make up his mind for himself, the means of
information being equally open to both.
Mrs. Bowman was a woman ol' kern acumen. She sought
the consultation r William Bowman and Donald Bowman. All persons examined the property. There is no
evidence to show any reliance on the part of any representation of J o h n Dussault nor is there any evidence of
such a representation. Consequently, fraud is not prese n t Restatement <</ i out inch § 470. Where parties are
dealing at arms length ;<nd i--eh has reasonable access
to the same knowledge and neither has a peculiar knowledge, fraud cannot be made out from non-disclosure.
Swenson v. Strout Realty, Inc., 452 l\2d 1)72 (Nev.
!;«*;»;, Phillips v. Homestake
(\ Plasser Mines i *>..
273 Pac, r,V7 •, li)2*h. In similar con!', '••is. the evidence
\v\s been deemed insufficient to establish fraud so as
to provide a basis for recovery. Utley v. Airoso, 464 P.2d
778 (Nev. 1970); Shira v. Cosgriff Neon Co., 320 P a c .
426 (No*.. l'<.>8) : Clarh Sanitation, Inc. ? K Sun Valley
Disposal

( ' . >:upra. 'The Tact that there was a family

tie or asso"»aiion :*''hi!"»n^i>n re!ween the parnes add
weigh* !')i ; .t sihMii.i'* ->n a * in sustain a ciiiiin of frami.
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In Thatcher v. Peterson, 20 Utah 2d 290, 437 P.2d 213
(1968) this court observed:
On this appeal we are asked to determine
whether membership in a religious fraternity
in and of itself establishes such a confidential
relationship that the law should protect one of
the parties because he is presumed to have been
influenced by the relationship. I t would
appear that a fiduciary or confidential relationship woud not arise out of the membership
in the fraternity above mentioned without
evidence to show such a situation did in fact
exist. The facts of record fail to show anything
other than an arm's length dealing among the
parties.
Consequently, fraud has not been made out.
D.

Statute of Limitations

The trial court found that respondents' action
arising out of the Nevada property transactions was
not precluded by the statute of limitations. As noted
before, the transfer of the property to John Dussault
occurred in June, 1961. The trial court found that Estella Bowman was fully competent up until November,
1967 (K, 565). The court further found that the statute
of limitations had not run because there was no showing
that Estella Bowman ever became aware of the true
situation prior to her becoming incompetent in 1967
(R. 197). Apparently, the trial court was applying
the statute of limitations applicable to fraud actions.
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;. * ^-I>-2(>(;i) Utah Cwiir Annotated, itKVi. However,
as noted before, fraud wns noi |)le;ul. a requirement
under the luv< of the Slate of Tt^h as we!! .is the State
! N< )n;i. si;), was there evideiiee presented to support
any claim of fraud. Further, the respondents were not
ihe injured party. Therefore, if the j u d g m e n t is to be
sustained against the appellants and in favor of the
respondents, it must rest on some oilier theory of relief
in which event the provision- of * 7?> !2-ii,n2h I'lah
Code Annotated, 11K>;J, v,«uild govern. Sinee the transfer occurred in \\H\\ an I no ."eiion \va:, brought within
four years thereafter, ilie provisions -f \hr reeited section would bar the notion.

For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the trial court's award of j u d g m e n t against the
appellants arising out of the Reno Ranch transaction
simply cannot stand. Such a determination of liability
is conceptually unsound.
CONCLUSION
I t is respectfully submitted that this court should
reverse directions to enter j u d g m e n t in favor of the
appellants, The trust instrument establishing the trust
which is the subject of the instant litigation obviously
demonstrated an intent to avoid holding trustees liable
:,

„

The statute of limitations applicable in the instant case would
be that of the State of Utah since the statute is procedural
and not substantive and the law of Nevada applies the same
standard. Ehrenzweig, Conflicts of Laws, Section 37 (1959);
Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 52
No. Car. I Rev, 489, 492 (1947),
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except in the rarest cases. The trial court at the time it
rendered its decision did not have the advantage of this
court's opinion in Dipo v. Dipo, supra. I n light of that
decision and the trust instrument in this case, appellants
cannot be held liable. The evidence does not support
liability and further the trial judge apparently interjected himself into the critical area of testifying. The
total evaluation of the administration of the trust shows
that the actions of appellants were at best those of misjudgment. Therefore, no liability should be imposed. I n
the alternative, this court should reverse and grant a
new trial requiring respondents to produce evidence in
lieu of that which the court produced through judicial
knowledge rather than judicial notice and requiring
the court to apply a proper measure of damages. Finally,
it is submitted that under no reasonable consideration of
the facts and the law, can appellants be held liable for
any actions associated with the Nevada property transfers. This court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD RICHARDS
670 28th Street
Ogden, Utah 84403
R O N A L D N. B O Y C E
2504 Simpson Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for Appellants
John and Dorothy Dussault
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